The ShiftShapers Podcast
Change either paralyzes or energizes - the choice is yours. Hear from businesses and entrepreneurs who have become energized and who have profited by shaping the shifts in their markets and practices. Become a SHIFTSHAPERS INSIDER and get our latest download, advance notice of all podcasts, podcast summaries, and special INSIDER-ONLY content. INSIDER SIGN UP
The ShiftShapers Podcast
Ep #125: PPACA Risk Adjustments Create Risk - With Tom Policelli
Use Left/Right to seek, Home/End to jump to start or end. Hold shift to jump forward or backward.
Under ACA, companies are being penalized for growth, perverse incentives abound and risk adjustments are creating . . . risk!
This week, Tom Policelli, CEO of Minuteman Health, joins us to discuss the unintended consequences of risk adjustment in the Affordable Care Act. Although it may not have crossed your radar yet, it’s important to understand the market uncertainty triggered by the federal government’s risk adjustment mechanisms and how that will impact advisors and the clients they serve.
Tom walks us through the three Rs established by the ACA: Risk adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk corridor. While these were developed to foster market stabilization, we discuss how each program is actually producing the reverse effect – sometimes with disastrous consequences.
Tom also talks about his work with the advocacy group, Choices Coalition, which is having some success bringing an awareness to the industry problems created by the ACA. He covers the practical solutions that have been proposed and the strategies some organizations are undertaking to address the little-known perverse incentives created by risk adjustment.
What You’ll Learn From this Episode:
- What risk adjustment is and how it impacts pricing and market stability.
- How Massachusetts had a head start responding to the unintended consequences.
- The three Rs as defined in the Affordable Care Act.
- How companies are being penalized for growth.
- The impact of risk adjustment on carriers and the plans they offer.
Have risk adjustment mechanisms inside the Affordable Care Act created a reverse Robin Hood environment? And how has that impacted offerings, pricings, and market stability? We'll find out on this episode of Shift Shapers.
SPEAKER_00Change either paralyzes or energizes. The choice is yours. You're listening to the Shift Shapers Podcast. You're about to learn firsthand from businesses and entrepreneurs who have successfully shaped the shifts in their industry. Get ready to become the change that you want to see. Here's your host and chief transformation strategist, David Stoltzman.
DavidThis episode of the Shift Shapers Podcast is brought to you by Captivated Health, a captive insurance arrangement designed specifically for educational institutions. If you have clients in that vertical, you know the healthcare deck has been stacked against them. Today, Captivated Health offers the stability, control, and savings they've been waiting for. For more information, go to www.captivatedhealth.com or click on the company logo on the Shift Shapers website. How can you be the first to know about each week's podcast and get on the list for special listener-only content? It's simple. Go to ShiftShapersOnline.com and click the subscribe button. On this episode of Shift Shapers, we welcome Tom Policelli. Tom is CEO of Minuteman Health, which is a not-for-profit that provides benefits to small businesses and individuals in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. But we're not going to talk about any of that stuff. What we are going to talk about is a little known and frequently misunderstood provision of ACA, which is called risk adjustment and how it's created some perverse incentives, but also a great deal of market uncertainty. So with that, welcome, Tom. Thank you. So let's level set. What is a risk adjustment mechanism?
SPEAKER_01Well, the idea behind risk adjustment is pretty straightforward and has been used for a bunch of years. And the idea is to say if there are multiple insurance companies in a given marketplace, you want to reward an insurance company for being better at doing their jobs and not for just having healthier people. So the idea is you try to find a way to measure the relative health status of the populations at each insurance company and adjust for it. So if one insurance company has people that are 10% healthier than the market, then they're going to pay into a pool. And if another carer has people who are 10% sicker, they'll pull money out of a pool and it will adjust. Insurance companies have voluntarily done this in several different risk adjustment mechanisms over the last 20 years. The largest right now is Aeon Hewitt's, about 3 million fully insured members. And a very, very different form of risk adjustment is used by the federal government in Medicare. And in that, insurance companies are basically have to prove that they can do a better job than the federal government. That's been relatively straightforward for insurance companies to do.
DavidSo for most mere mortals, risk adjustment is something that unless you're kind of a student of that portion of the business, it might not have crossed your radar. And then even prior to ACA, and we'll we'll delve into ACA because it's most of what we're going to talk about, but Massachusetts had a little dabble with and is still doing. Are they not risk adjustments?
SPEAKER_01So Massachusetts, I guess two chapters in the Massachusetts story. The first chapter was Massachusetts did healthcare reform half a dozen years before the federal government did it. And Massachusetts elected to not put in any form of risk adjustment for this new population. And it's interesting because a lot of people theorized that that would create problems, and it actually did not. Premium increases were small, the market was stable, percentage of uninsured dropped to 2 or 3%, and it worked out pretty well. When the ACA was passed, it required there to be a risk adjustment mechanism. And so the state then established its own following the federal guidelines. But it was really because the feds required it. And even when Massachusetts did it, CMS, the feds had to approve each and every line item in it. So it's really a federal, federally imposed idea for Massachusetts and obviously for the whole rest of the country under the ACA.
DavidAaron Ross Powell Why did the framers of ACA think that this kind of a mechanism was going to be necessary? What behaviors were they trying to induce?
SPEAKER_01They were trying to do two things that are deeply related. One is they wanted to make sure that certain insurance companies wouldn't be able to cherry pick and just pick healthy people. And the second thing they wanted to do was to reward insurance companies for enrolling the sickest people. And those are obviously related, but they don't have to be taken to the extreme that that CMS, again, it's I keep saying CMS, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, it's federal government. What CMS did was design a formula that took that to the extreme. So it's significantly overpenalizing people who are being scored as being healthier, an underlying score. It doesn't mean they are healthier, it just means the way the feds score them, they look healthier. And it overpays for people who are scored with certain kinds of sicknesses. And not to get into the weeds too much, but what whenever you set up a mechanism that is penalizing structurally one section of the market, that part of the market disappears. And we're seeing that. And that means that prices go up for everybody. If you have nothing left but a group of sick people, premiums are going to be extremely high, and your uninsured rate is going to stay high also. And so that's the dynamic the feds have accidentally set up here, is one that is driving out the very people that any insurance pool needs, right? You don't want to just offer homeowners' insurance to people whose houses are smoking and may indeed burst into flames. You need everybody's house to be insured in order to make the home insurance market make sense.
DavidSo the base premise of ACA, which was that there were going to be loads of young healthies signing up, they've now Are you saying they've killed the goose that laid the golden egg?
SPEAKER_01Yes, and it's not just risk adjustment that has done this, but this is kind of the final blow. But the right now what you have is insurance markets that are not functioning. So if you look around the country and you're starting to see some significant premium increases, in some states the average is 20%, some it's 30%, even in the mid-teens, you're seeing these enormous increases in the insurance rates. And you need to step back and ask yourself: are the people in that state 30% sicker than they were the year before? No, they're not. You know, the hospital prices double, they did not. We hear about drug prices, and drug prices are certainly an issue, but drugs are 18% of my total spend. You could double it, and it would still have leave me with a rate increase in the single digits. The reason why the prices are going up so dramatically in certain areas of the country is that risk pool is broken. Basically, the feds have broken the risk pool, and they're driving out the people you need in order to have the healthier people in order to have a stable market. And so with an unstable market, the only rational thing for any licensed insurance company to do is to significantly raise prices. And that's an awful dynamic. But that's where we are right now in many pockets of the country.
DavidOftentimes you talk about the three Rs as they apply to this. What are those? Why do they matter?
SPEAKER_01So the three R's were established by law in the ACA, but the portion that established them are very is very small, and it's entitled Stabilization, Market Stabilization. So Congress required in the law that with all these changes, CMS put in some programs that would help dampen fluctuations and keep the market working. And these three things were number one, risk adjustment, which we've been talking about, and that goes on forever. And then there were two temporary programs. One was called reinsurance, and the other is called risk corridor. And if you'd like, I can go into briefly what each of them was supposed to do. It's a little bit geeky. If you would please. Sure. Okay, so reinsurance is the simplest. And reinsurance simply says for any claim that goes over a certain dollar amount, the federal government will administer a pool. This is all supposed to be just insurance industry money, that will reimburse an insurance company, a portion of that claim. So if a claim, for example, goes over $75,000, the federal government will reimburse half of the amount over $75,000 but below $250,000. And the money to fund that comes from an assessment that is charged to every single insurance company and self-funded entity. All pays into this pool, the feds administer it, and then they pay out for high dollar claims. So the insurance companies and the self-funded entities all pay into a pool that is administered by the federal government. That's not supposed to be federal dollars, it's just insurance industry money. Does that make sense? Okay, so that was number one. Number two is risk adjustment that we've been talking about. We're supposed to move money around depending on which planet's healthier or not healthier people. And then the third part is what's called risk corridor. And risk corridor says that if one insurance company has a windfall profit, then it pays in. And if another company has some shockingly large loss, then it pulls money out. So those are the three categories. Unfortunately, none of these three have worked the way the federal government thought they would, or even close. So the first one, reinsurance, ended up significantly overfunded. The federal government charged way more money than it needed and ended up basically paying out enormous windfall profits to certain insurance companies. And a lot of those monies went to companies that really weren't playing on the exchange, playing much. The second, the risk adjustment we've been talking about really has two problems with it. One is it's scoring people incorrectly, it's scoring people as being healthier than they are, particularly for a growing, fast growing company, because you don't know enough about those members yet. You don't have their five years with a claim history on them, so you don't know what's out there. So they get scored as being too healthy. And then getting the weeds on you here, but then the real kick in the pants on risk adjustment is that when you're scored as being healthier than you are, you don't pay out based on your costs. You pay out based on the market average premium. What that does is it penalizes any affordable plan and any lower cost plan. So basically any bronze plans automatically penalized. Any company that's offering a focused network with high efficiency providers, automatically penalized. It's so none of that makes sense. And then the last, the risk corridor, was again supposed to be funded by insurance industry money, and that ended up only paying out 12.6 cents on the dollar last year. And we'll see about this year, but it's not expected to be much better this year because, again, the feds calibrated this incorrectly. They did not understand that risk adjustment would create massive volatility, and that massive volatility has then bankrupted the risk corridor program also. So I'm sorry for that very geeky overview here, but the bottom line when you step back is that the insurance industry is designed to offer people stability. That's the whole idea. You, as an individual, may have your health claims be very low one year and very high the next year, and we're supposed to smooth it all out for you. And these programs, these quote, stabilization programs, are doing exactly the opposite by making the market more volatile. The risk adjustment program alone caused, on average, insurance companies for the last two years to exchange 10% of their revenue, to mail 10% of your revenue to your competitor. This is in an industry that earns 1% or 2% in a given year. So years worth of your earnings are fluctuating through a formula that the feds have now admitted needs to be overhauled. And that 10% is on average, you know, high growth companies paying 25% of their premium out to their competitors is not unusual. And that's not a good thing. That's not sustainable. You're going to drive out new competitors and you're going to drive prices up higher. And so this, I guess, to step all the way back, I have concluded that the only law in Washington, D.C. that appears to work is the law of unintended consequences. And it works with a vengeance, as we're seeing here.
DavidYeah, they seem to have mastered PhD level unintended consequences. Let's move away from the geeky and let's get down to the practical. I mean, there's some examples that you and I chatted about off-air of actual real life companies where the numbers and the transfer make absolutely no sense. Can you give us a couple of those real-world examples?
SPEAKER_01Sure. Start off with some companies that are quite large and have been doing the Medicare version of risk adjustment for many years. So they're experienced at playing this game. And so if you look, for example, I'm looking down at my list at a Humana. You know, Humana is a company that's been doing this for a long time, and they've gotten absolutely hammered wherever they have grown. So in Florida, they grew their membership significantly and paid out $147 million in risk adjustment, or will rather, in two weeks. That's pretty astonishing. Molina in Florida, again, $219 million. Coventry Health, which is Aetna, owned by Aetna, also in Florida, $111 million they're paying out. That's and that all three of those companies grew significantly and therefore were penalized. That is simply absurd and helps underscore why rational companies like all three of them are having to raise prices significantly or just exit those markets. And if you look at smaller companies, you know, the good news if you're a big company is this is crazy, but it's not going to kill the company. You can just exit the market and throw up your hands and leave in disgust. But if you're a smaller company, and so just to flip to uh closer to where I live, you flip up to Connecticut, you've got a company like Connecticut, which has been around for 30 years. It was the biggest grower on the state exchange, and they have had to pay out over $30 million, which represents 40% of their entire surplus. That's their reserves. So in one year they lose 40% of all of their money due to this program that, again, even the feds admit needs to get overhauled. So I don't know if I can keep going with examples, but that's the type of volatility you're seeing in the market, and that's why so many are concerned.
DavidAnd now a word from our sponsor. Captivated Health is a single source solution for your clients and prospects who are in the education vertical. The founders of Captivated Health have nearly 20 years' experience working with educational institutions, and over that time, they've developed a keen understanding of the unique problems these clients experience. Frustrated by a lack of control, the unpredictability of ever increasing health care costs, and the pressures and regulations of the Affordable Care Act, these groups have been adrift in the fully insured commercial marketplace until now. Captivated Health has built a program that solves those problems, and it does so with virtually no disruption to faculty and staff while saving clients millions of dollars. We wanted you to be among the first to know that Captivated Health is building a national distribution partner network so you can bring this cutting-edge solution to the educational clients you advise. To learn more about the Captivated Health Solution, go to their website at www.captivated health.com or click on their logo on the Shift Shapers website. And now back to our interview. Are there some instances where companies have both paid out and received?
SPEAKER_01Well, there are a couple of companies that paid out a lot last year and didn't this year. And so for example, Kaiser and Colorado last year paid out a lot of money because they grew a lot in the first year of the exchange. And the second year they did not grow and they did not pay out. So you saw you see switches on a regional basis. From companies overall, the consistent winner really is I'd say United Healthcare. United cleared, I have to pull the exact number here, but in the neighborhood of $300 million in New York, and that's a market where they didn't play. So it's kind of the flip side of what I said. If you grow, you get penalized. If you don't grow, if you refuse to grow, United is famously pulling out of exchanges, then you can get you can receive enormous sums of money because you chose not to grow, because you chose to exit, you get rewarded for that. Again, not at all what was intended in this program.
DavidSo we've got three or four minutes left. Let's try to look towards the future. What steps are being taken by the federal government? What steps do you think need to be taken? And what's the likelihood that this is going to get fixed before some smaller insurance companies just flat go out of business?
SPEAKER_01The good news, let's do a little bit of good news in here, is that the federal government has now responded to the concerns, many of the concerns that folks like us have been bringing up. And when I say that, we and a bunch of other companies got together and formed a new coalition called the Choices Coalition. And we've been putting out white papers on the structural problems here and recommending specific solutions. And CMS has acknowledged many of these. That's good. There is not enough detail, however, to see if what they want to do to fix it will work. But most alarmingly, their timeline is over the next five years, and that's simply too long. To the very last part of your question, if we wait four or five years to make this thing work as it should, then there won't be a lot of competition. Companies will either exit given markets or as you identified, they may just go away entirely, the companies. So this needs to get fixed rapidly. And that's why we're so focused on proposing specific, simplistic, realistic solutions that could be phased in now.
DavidCould you give us an example or two of some of the things that the coalition is talking about?
SPEAKER_01Certainly. We just put out a new paper a week ago that focuses, again, on the weeds here, but the bronze plans specifically have been penalized, and there was an error in the federal calculation that was identified five years ago, but never fixed. And this simple error has made it that effectively no bronze plan anywhere is one that will be financially successful. And that's why companies are dropping bronze plans or raising prices. So one simple fix is to take CMS's own data, their own proposed fix that they've pointed to, and do it now. There's absolutely no reason to wait. And that could help dampen the some of these fund flows by 20%, which is significant when you're talking about $100 million.
DavidBut we're still, at least for the short term, stuck in one of these darned if you do, darned if you don't markets. Correct?
SPEAKER_01We really are. And unfortunately, as I think we're gonna start to see this fall when the new premium rates come out, the real people who are stuck are the small employers and the individuals. I mean, at the end of the day, that's what this is all about. And they're the ones who are gonna get stuck the worst. But what this, I guess, again, in the faint good news category, is that very, very little of what needs to get fixed has anything to do with Congress. And passing a law and all that, because that's complicated and time consuming. Virtually all of what needs to happen is CMS either doing making some changes to its own rules, which it makes, or allowing the states to step in and try and fix this. CMS has acknowledged that states should try to do it, but has not allowed any state, to my knowledge, to do anything. And several states have proposed multiple specific solutions, and CMS has shot them all down. So they really just need to let the states fix this. States are the ones who regulate insurance companies, and they should be allowed to do their jobs.
DavidWell, there's a lot of action on the state front. I mean, Evergreen Health in Maryland has filed a lawsuit. That's right. I know that Illinois' acting insurance director told the Land of Lincoln, which is a health co-op out there, not to make his 2015 risk adjustment. There are also initiatives going on in New Mexico and New York and Connecticut. Are any of those getting traction?
SPEAKER_01Aaron Ross Powell It's tough. I mean, I'd say so far that CMS has been fighting hard to not change anything. And I am not an attorney, but what I've come to learn in speaking to all the attorneys we employ, it's very hard to make the federal government change anything. It is presumed by law that the federal government anything they do has three components to it. One is that it's non-political. Number two is that it's designed brilliantly, and number three is that it's executed perfectly. And the law, the court has forced to presume those three things to be correct, even if they may not be. Even if they're 0 for three, you can say it. So that's tough. But you're right, legal activity is ramping up. There's a few other, you know, Molina's suing, HIMARC is suing, a few, you know, there's a lot of legal activity. Every single insurance company is getting phone calls from law firms all over the place because they're all realize. If you step back, and what I mentioned earlier, when you're talking about huge portion of your revenue swinging due to these formulas that aren't really working well, hammering on the capital base. Every CEO and every board member out there has a fiduciary obligation to step back and say, well, what can we do about this? And you know, on the menu of things that must be considered is legal action. So I think every company is considering it. What companies choose to do, we'll find out over time. But you simply have to when, you know, as someone with a legal obligation to protect the assets of the company, you have to do everything you can to evaluate what you need to do. And yeah, we're doing that. We've hired lawyers and we're reviewing it and regular meetings with our board. You have to.
DavidThis is too extreme. Well, a good place to push pause on this conversation, Tom, but we do hope that you'll come back again and update us as things change.
SPEAKER_01Well, thank you very much. I really appreciate it.
DavidTom Policelli, CEO of Minuteman Health, which is up here in my neck of the woods, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Tom's given a lot of study this. Tom, thank you so much for sharing your expertise with our audience today.
SPEAKER_01I really appreciate the time.
DavidThank you. The Ship Shapers Podcast is a production of Strategic Vision Publishing and David Saltzman. This podcast may not be reproduced in any form, in whole or in part, without the express written permission of the producers. All rights reserved.